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Article 25/2021

Labour Edge

In terms of a health and safety collective agreement, an employee was appointed as a fulltime health and safety shop steward (HSS).  To what extent does this collective agreement between the employer and trade union constitute a contract for the benefit of a third party (stipulatio alteri), namely, the employee?

The labour appeal court recently, in Maripane v Glencore Operations SA (Pty) Ltd (Lion Ferrochrome) (2019) 30 SALLR 163 (LAC), adopted the following approach to this issue:

  1. the test whether a contract is made for the benefit of a third party (a stipulatio alteri) is whether, by adopting the contract, the third party can become a party to it (see GB Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7 ed. (LexisNexis 2016). at 266 and the cases referred to there, including Crookes v Watson 1956 (1) SA 277 (A) at 291C; and Joel Melamed and Horwitz v Cleveland Estates (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 155 (A). at 172A–F); and
  2. because of its terms and the way in which it was structured, the agreement was capable of being construed as a contract made for the benefit of a third party(ies), such as the health and safety representatives envisaged in it. By standing for and being elected to the position of HSS, they adopted the agreement and a vinculum iuris was created between the elected HSS, NUM and the employer (i.e. the respondent). As a result, they (individually and respectively) came into the agreement as a party with one of the parties to the agreement, were bound by it and could enforce its terms insofar as those terms related to them (see: inter alia, McCullough v Fernwood Estates Ltd 1920 A.D. 204 at 206, cited in Christie’s (above). at 310). These would include the terms relating to their qualifications, their appointment, their term of office, their conditions of employment, including their reporting obligations, their remuneration, their hours of work, their facilities, the termination of their appointment and the manner in which they had to perform their functions, the obligations of the respondent, including its obligation to inform the health and safety representatives of inspections, accidents, etc, the obligations of secrecy, the dispute procedures regarding disclosures of information, and the training of health and safety representatives;

November 9, 2026

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

November 2, 2026

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

October 26, 2026

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?