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Article 24/2022

With reference to Mogalakwena Local Municipality v The Provincial Executive Council, Limpopo and Others (2014) JOL 32103, what were the principles recently endorsed by the labour court in Munthali v PRASA (2021) 32 SALLR 22 (LC) when considering whether or not an applicant has established the required urgency when demanding re-employment on an urgent basis?

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The labour court endorsed the following principles:

  • the labour court enjoys a discretion in according a matter urgency. In the exercise of its discretion, the labour court examined whether the applicant had, in the founding papers, set out circumstances which justified that the application be heard as one of urgency, and the basis upon which it was said that substantial redress would not be obtained at a hearing in due course. Whether an applicant is able to obtain substantial redress in due course is dependent on the facts and particular circumstances of each case (see East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Limited and another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Limited and Others (2012) JOL 28244 (GSJ), at paragraphs [6] and [7] and see also Export Development Canada and Another v Westdawn Investments Proprietary and Others [2018] 2 All SA 783 (GJ), at paragraph [11] and Mogalakwena Local Municipality v The Provincial Executive Council, Limpopo and Others (2014) JOL 32103 (GP), at paragraphs [63] to [64])
  • of equal importance is that urgent relief will be denied in circumstances where the applicant has failed to act with the necessary haste in approaching the court, as the primary objective of approaching a court on an urgent basis is to prevent harm or prejudice from occurring (see Golding v HCI Managerial Services (Pty) Ltd and Others [2015] 1 BLLR 91 (LC), at paragraph [24]; Ntozini and Others v African National Congress and Others (18798/2018) [2018] ZAGPJHC 415 (25 June 2018), at paragraph [11])
  • the starting point was whether the applicant had approached the labour court with the necessary haste, which it agreed she had done. The public announcement of the termination had taken place on 30 January 2021, and she had received written confirmation of the termination on 1 February 2021. It is accepted that she had taken a further four days prior to putting PRASA on terms, but that delay, in the light of the circumstances of the case, had been negligible, in view of PRASA’s response of 9 February 2021 to her letter of demand
  • the issue of whether financial hardship is a basis of seeking urgent relief has received attention in the labour and other courts. In other decisions, it has been held that, as a general principle, financial hardship does not establish a basis for urgency (see Hultzer v Standard Bank of South Africa (Pty) Limited (J 469/99) [1999] ZALC 46 (25 March 1999), at paragraph [13]; Jonker v Wireless Payment Systems CC (2010) 31 ILJ 381 (LC), at paragraph [16])
  • it has been held that the mere fact that irreparable financial losses have been suffered or would be suffered by the applicant was not, by itself, sufficient ground to acquire the requisite urgency necessary to justify a departure from the ordinary court rules (Ntefe J Ledimo and Others v Minister of Safety and Security and Others (2242/2003) [2003] ZAFSHC 16 (28 August 2003), at paragraph [32])
  • in Harley v Bacarac Trading 39 (Pty) Ltd (2009) 30 ILJ 2085 (LC), it was held that the general principle may be departed from if exceptional circumstances are established, depending on the merits of each case, and the labour court in casu followed this approach
  • in casu, it was found that the exceptional circumstances were created by the reputational damage and slim prospects of securing alternative employment, seeing that the termination of employment took place publicly, entailed a misrepresentation of facts and had the consequences of potential or actual public humiliation
July 20, 2026

Precautionary suspensions

In the public sector, the Senior Management Service Handbook (SMS Handbook) directly addresses precautionary suspensions and the 60-day time limit.

Clause 2.7(2)(c) of the SMS Handbook provides that ‘If a member is suspended or transferred as a precautionary measure, the employer must hold a disciplinary hearing within 60 days. The chair of the hearing must then decide on any further postponement.’

Regulation 6 of the Local Government: Disciplinary Regulations Senior Managers, 2010 (Regulations) provides for the precautionary suspension of senior municipal employees and Regulation 6(6)(a) provides: ‘If a senior is suspended, a disciplinary hearing must commence within three months after the date of suspension, failing which the suspension will automatically lapse.’

What are the principles governing a determination of the question as to whether or not a senior municipal employee’s suspension automatically lapses in terms of the aforesaid Regulation 6(6)(a)?

Obviously, the answers to the aforesaid question are very relevant in the private sector where, firstly, a collective agreement regulates a similar process or, alternatively, such contractual rights have been created between the parties, to be enforced in terms of s77(3) of the BCEA.

July 13, 2026

In the previous article, we dealt with the consequences of a plant level collective agreement with a definite beginning and end date. We indicated to you that, in line with s23(2) of the LRA, and an analysis of the relevant case law, that, once such a collective agreement reaches its expiry date, it expires and is no longer of any force or effect. In this article, we deal with the scenario where a plant level collective agreement is concluded for an indefinite period and the employer gave notice to terminate same.

What are the consequences when a party to a plant level collective agreement, concluded for an indefinite time period, gives notice to terminate such collective agreement?

July 6, 2026

In terms of s23(2), a collective agreement binds, for the whole period of the collective agreement, every person so bound in terms of s23(1)(c) (the members of a registered trade union and the employers who are members of a registered employers’ organisation who are a party to the collective agreement, if the collective agreement regulates the terms and conditions of employment, or the conduct of the employers and employees) who was a member at the time it became binding, or who becomes a member after it became binding (irrespective of whether or not that person continues to be a member of such trade union or employers’ organisation for the duration of the collective agreement).

What is the relevant case law development as to a plant level collective agreement that has an expiry date, i e does such collective agreement continue to be of force and effect after such expiry date?