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Article 23/2024

LabourEdge

Is an employer vicariously liable where its employee is sexually harassed by a superior employee?

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  • In Erasmus v Dr Beyers Naude Local Municipality and Jack (2021) 32 SALLR 6 (ECG); (2021) 42 ILJ 1543 (ECG), the high court paid consideration to the following factors:
    • the employee, when committing the act of sexual harassment, acted solely for his own purpose
    • the incident happened whilst rendering his services for the employer, thus requiring consideration of the objective test pertaining to deviation matters (see Article 22/2024)
  • The high court in casu came to the following conclusions:
    • the nature of the employment relationship presented an opportunity for the wrongful act to be executed in the course of carrying out the employee’s duties
    • there is a duty on an employer to ensure that the employee placed in a position of trust is capable of such trust
    • the trust forged a causal link between the employee executing the wrongful act and the wrongful act itself
    • consequently, the employer and the employee, who committed the sexual harassment, are jointly and severally liable for damages the employee (who was sexually harassed) can prove as a result of the wrongful act (i e the act of sexual harassment)
  • Kindly take note that this common law liability exists over and above the statutory vicarious liability in terms of s60 of the Employment Equity Act.
November 9, 2026

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

November 2, 2026

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

October 26, 2026

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?