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Article 22/2023

What is the interpretive approach to be adopted in respect of, inter alia:

  • pre-trial minutes
  • content of the BCEA
  • strike ballot guidelines
  • protest action
  • the content of the LRA
  • a separation agreement
  • benefits
  • advisory arbitration award
  • secondary strikes, etc?

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Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) (para [18] et seq) formulates the approach to be adopted when interpreting legislation, other statutory instruments or contracts and essentially entails the following:

  • the starting point is attributing meaning to words used in the aforesaid documents
  • the language of the provisions must be read with reference to the context (reading the document as a whole), the purpose of the provision(s) and the background preparation and production of
    the document
  • obviously, consideration must be given to the language used with reference to the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax
  • where more than one meaning is possible, each meaning must be weighted with reference to the aforesaid factors and a sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that leads to insensible or unbusinesslike results or undermines the apparent purpose of the document
  • judges (and arbitrators) must be alert not to substitute what they think is reasonable, sensible or businesslike for the actual words used in the documents
  • the process of interpretation is objective and not subjective

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?