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Article 21/2025

The constitutional court, recently, in Regenesys Management (Pty) Ltd t/a Regenesys v Illungo (2024) 35 SALLR 113 (CC), had the opportunity to, once again, look at this scenario and, in doing so, placed the following principles under the spotlight:
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  • it is an acceptable approach that, when restructuring takes place, an employer is entitled to propose a change of the current organisational structure by proposing the adjustment and streamlining of roles and positions – such altered job functions are to be evaluated in terms of s189 and s189A
  • when an employee is dislocated from a current job in a current organigram and is required to participate in a placement process regarding a new job or jobs in a new organigram, it is not unfair to require such employee to apply for such jobs and to participate in the placement process
  • placement criteria for the new job may entail the following:
    • qualifications and experience
    • qualification and potential
    • LIFO
  • in Pratten v Afrisun (2020) 31 SALLR 159 (LC), a similar approach was followed, but the employer regarded the placement criteria as related to technical competencies (e g can the employee drive the bus) and behavioural competencies (e g should the employee be a bus driver) – within this environment, the LC recognised, in respect of behavioural competencies, the utilisation of psychometric testing
  • when an employee competes in the placement process, such criteria are not selection criteria in terms of s189(2)(b) or s189(7) of the LRA
  • Regenesys (CC) makes it clear, like Pratten (supra), that, if an employee does not make it in the placement process, and stays dislocated, the subsequent fairness of his/her dismissal still needs to be established in terms of the normal selection criteria applicable to dismissals for operational requirements

See, further, Telkom SA Soc Ltd v Van Staden (2021) 32 SALLR 8 (LAC); (2021) 42 ILJ 869 (LAC) and SA Breweries (Pty) Ltd v Louw (2017) 28 SALLR 71 (LAC)

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?