Skip to main content

Article 20/2024

LabourEdge

With reference to Potgieter v Samancor Chrome Ltd t/a Tubatse Ferrochrome (2022) 33 SALLR 190 (LC) and Van Rensburg and Others v Department of Justice and Correctional Services and Others (2022) 33 SALLR 280 (LC); (2022) 43 ILJ 2110 (LC), what are the prescription principles applicable, firstly, to the dismissal of an employee and, secondly, to the award of the CCMA or the relevant bargaining council?

_____________________________________

  • It is submitted that the correct approach to be adopted to prescription is that as set out by the constitutional court in Food & Allied Workers Union obo Gaoshubelwe v Pieman’s Pantry (Pty) Ltd (2018) 39 ILJ 1213 (CC)
    • This approach has consistently been followed by the labour appeal court in, inter alia, National Union of Mineworkers obo Majebe v Civil & General Contractors CC (2021) 42 ILJ 1027 (LC), and the labour court (e g the Van Rensburg judgment (supra))
  • With reference to the aforesaid, the following relevant principles can be extracted:
    • the Prescription Act is applicable to all claims in terms of the LRA
    • a claim for reinstatement (with or without back pay), re-employment or compensation is a ‘debt’ as envisaged in the Prescription Act
    • a three-year period is applicable to such debt
    • the referral of an unfair dismissal claim or ‘unfair labour practice claim’ to the CCMA or the relevant bargaining council interrupts prescription and prescription remains interrupted until any review proceedings in relation to the process are finalised (including appeals) – a review and appeal in this regard is a ‘process’ ito s15(1) of the Prescription Act
    • the award in respect of which the claim is granted is also a debt in terms of the Prescription Act – it prescribes three years after being issued unless, once again, interrupted

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?