Skip to main content

Article 19/2025

How are medical certificates to be dealt with in the absence of affidavits from doctors or evidence given by doctors who issued such medical certificates?

_____________________________________

  • The nature of a medical certificate is that it is opinion evidence and, therefore, can only be given by an expert and not by a layman (i e the employee who is
    the beneficiary of the medical certificate is not permitted to give evidence in this regard).
  • Of importance when considering the absence of an affidavit from the issuing doctor or the lack of evidence by the issuing doctor is a consideration of the reason why such evidence is not given – in this regard, due consideration must be given to abuse considerations, whether or not the doctor is not prepared to defend the certificate he/she issued and whether or not such doctor is not prepared to spend the time providing expert evidence in respect of the medical certificate issued.
  • Obviously, the absence of an affidavit by the issuing medical practitioner, or the absence of evidence, is to the prejudice of the employer, seeing that the employer is deprived of the opportunity of testing the medical certificate by means of its own-appointed practitioner.
  • Seeing that a medical certificate, in the absence of an affidavit or evidence given by the issuing medical practitioner, constitutes hearsay evidence, entailing that the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1998 is applicable, the presiding officer of the disciplinary investigation (inclusive of the arbitrator at the CCMA, etc) has the discretion, in terms of s3(1)(c) of the said Act, to admit such medical certificate in the absence of an affidavit or such required evidence, or not to consider such medical certificate at all.
  • In short, when the medical certificate is challenged, the onus is on the employee to prove that he/she was indisposed, as well as the extent of the incapacity – see, further, Old Mutual Life Assurance v Gumbi 2007 (5) SA 552 (SCA).
  • In expanding the above principles, the labour appeal court, in Mghobozi v Naidoo and Others [2006] 3 BLLR 242 (LAC), said the following, at paragraph [28]:
    • ‘The absence of affidavits from doctors means that the court is deprived of any elaboration of the widely and vaguely-stated symptoms attributed to the appellant. The nature of the medication and the efficacy thereof is also not explained.’

See, further, NUMSA v Kaefer Energy Projects (2022) 33 SALLR 11 (LC)

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?