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Article 19/2023

The constitutional court, in NUMSA v Marley Pipe Systems (2022) 33 SALLR 22 (CC), held that the labour appeal court wrongly created the following principles pertaining to common purpose misconduct:

  • in order to escape guilt in respect of common purpose, the bystander has to take positive steps to disassociate himself from the act of the actual perpetrator
  • thus, to escape guilt, the bystander is required to intervene and protect (e g the co-employee being assaulted)

Largely, on the basis of the aforesaid principles, the labour appeal court wrongly held in casu, according to the constitutional court, that bystanders (at the scene of the assault), as well as a NUMSA shop steward (who arrived after the assault), were guilty on the basis of common purpose.

What is the approach recently adopted by the constitutional court in Marley Pipe Systems in order to provide some clarity in the above regard?

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  • The starting point is an appreciation of the common purpose principles as set out in S v Mgedezi 1989 (1) SA 687 (A), dealing specifically with the scenario where a person is present at the scene of the misconduct (as is, however, evident hereunder, presence at the scene of the misconduct is not a determinative factor) – these principles can be summarised as follows:
    • the employee charged with common purpose misconduct must be aware of the primary
      misconduct
    • he must have intended to make common purpose with the actual perpetrator(s)
    • he must have manifested his sharing of common purpose with the actual perpetrator(s) by
      himself performing some act of association
    • mens rea is required – either in the form of intention or the foreseeability of the possibility of
      misconduct and being reckless as to whether or not such misconduct takes place
  • With reference to Dunlop Mixing CC, the constitutional court, as indicated above, adopted the approach that, to attract liability or establish such complicity for the purposes of misconduct, presence at the scene is not a requirement – in this regard, and with reference to Dunlop Mixing, the constitutional court indicated that the requirements for derivative misconduct are equally applicable to common purpose, namely:
    • there must be evidence (direct or circumstantial) that the employee associated himself or
      herself with the misconduct
    • before such primary misconduct commenced or even after it ended
    • presence at the scene is not a requirement, but prior or subsequent knowledge of the primary misconduct is required in order to evaluate whether the requisite intention to associate has been complied with
  • Bystanders present at the scene of the primary misconduct cannot be found guilty on the basis of common purpose if no proof exists of their complicity in the misconduct (including proof of guilt on the basis of common purpose) – common guilt is simply not part of our law
  • The principles established in Oak Valley Estates regulating interdicts are not applicable to the doctrine of common purpose – in the interdict environment, as indicated in Article 17/2023, failure by bystanders to take positive steps to disassociate themselves with the action of a group may lead to an interdict being obtained against them
  • In conclusion, the following approach was adopted:
    • mere presence at the scene of the primary misconduct and watching the primary misconduct does not form the basis for being guilty on the ground of common purpose
    • evidence (direct or substantial) is required to prove, firstly, association with the primary misconduct (before, during or after same) and, secondly, the shared common purpose with the perpetrator(s), by himself, performing some act of association
November 9, 2026

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

November 2, 2026

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

October 26, 2026

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?