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Article 18/2025

What is an employer to do when it suspects that a medical practitioner is issuing pre- signed sick notes, or permitting its employees to buy sick notes, or, alternatively, is engaging in some other dubious practice regarding the issue of sick notes? What is an employer to do when it suspects that a person is not entitled to practice as a medical doctor?

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The labour appeal court, in Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others [2024] 8 BLLR 881 (LAC); (2024) 45 ILJ 2270 (LAC), provided the following guidelines in the above regard:

  • the employer is required to investigate the matter and report it to the relevant authorities, including the Health Professions Council of South Africa, the South African Medical and Dental Council and the Health Science Academy (if the practitioner holds a dispensing certificate);
  • the idea that an employee, who happens to go to a doctor who is not trusted (or a person suspected of not being a medical practitioner), must be subjected to a disciplinary process for utilising the services of such person is rejected – at the very least, the employer should investigate these suspicions and, if the suspicions are well-founded, the employee should be warned against using the particular doctor;
  • at all relevant times, the investigation into the alleged conduct should be conducted by the relevant entities as identified above.

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?