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Article 16/2023

Is an employer entitled to institute a second disciplinary enquiry relating to a new and different charge as compared to the original disciplinary enquiry?

Is an employer entitled to, after having informally handed down a sanction, to subject an employee toa formal enquiry?

After a first enquiry, is an employer entitled to ask the employee to make representations as to why the original sanction should not be altered?

Is an employer entitled to substitute a sanction where same is not permitted by such employer’s
disciplinary code?

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The labour court, in Moloantoa v CCMA (2021) 32 SALLR 46 (LC), in essence, identified the following
scenarios:

Scenario 1: the second enquiry relates to a new and different charge based on newly-discovered evidence

  • this scenario does not entail the changing of an original sanction and is permitted, subject to what is stated hereunder
  • BMW (SA) v Van der Walt (2002) ILJ 113 (LAC) established fairness as the only yardstick in the above regard

Scenario 2: after having informally implemented discipline, the employer conducts a formal disciplinary enquiry, leading to a different sanction

  • this action of the employer is permitted subject to what is stated hereunder
  • this scenario was specifically dealt with by the labour appeal court in Branford v Metrorail (2003)
    24 ILJ 2269 (LAC), where it was stated that fairness is the only yardstick – with reference to
    NUMSA v Vetsak 1996 (4) SA 577 (A), where it was held that both the interests of the employee
    and the employer must be considered to reach a balanced and equitable assessment

Scenario 3: after the first enquiry, the employee is required to make representations as to why the
sanction should not be altered

  • it appears that such approach will also be permitted and that the only yardstick is fairness
  • Branford is not authority that this scenario amounts to a second enquiry being held

Scenario 4: no substitution of a sanction permitted

  • In SARS v CCMA [2008] 6 BLLR 540 (LAC), it was held that substituting a sanction under these
    circumstances will lead to an invalid action on the part of the employer and does not amount to
    procedural unfairness
  • the viewpoint is held that such approach deprives the employer of the opportunity to justify its
    action and, in any case, is contrary to Steenkamp v Edcon [2016] 4 BLLR 335 (CC) and Branford

In Moloantoa, the labour court held that it was bound to follow SARS and made the finding that the
action of the employer attracted invalidity and not mere procedural unfairness.

It is also to be remembered that, if the substitution of a sanction is contrary to a collective agreement,
then s24 of the LRA is applicable.

Lastly, when exceptional circumstances are present, an employer may also approach the labour court
to alter the sanction (Executive Council Finance KwaZulu-Natal v Dorkin [2008] 6 BLLR 540 (LAC)).

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?