Article 15/2024

Motion proceedings (including applications in terms of rule 31 of the CCMA rules) are not designed to resolve disputes of fact, but indeed disputes of law.  What is the content of the test formulated in Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) and so applied subsequently in Thebe Ya Bophelo Healthcare Administrators v National Bargaining Council for the Road Freight Industry 2009 (3) SA 187 (W) in determining how such disputes are resolved when considering whether the applicant is entitled to the relief claimed in such motion proceedings?


  • The facts averred in the applicant’s affidavit, admitted by the respondent, with the facts alleged by the respondent, must justify the order, unless:
    • the dispute is not real or genuine (on the basis of a bare denial), or
    • the denials in the respondent’s version are bald and uncreditworthy. or
    • the respondent’s version raises obvious fictitious disputes of fact, or
    • the respondent’s version is palpably implausible or farfetched, or so clearly untenable that the court is justified in rejecting that version

See, further, National Scrap Metal (Cape Town) v Murray and Roberts 2012 (5) SA 300 (SCA); Ndudane v Premier of Eastern Cape (2022) 33 SALLR 6 (ECB); National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 (2) SA 279 (SCA).

On what basis will a client of a labour broker be held vicariously liable for the injuries suffered by an employee employed by a labour broker when such employee performs functions at the client’s workplace?

Is an employer vicariously liable where its employee is sexually harassed by a superior employee?

It is well-established that an employer is vicariously liable (faultlessly liable) for the wrong committed by an employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment (Feldman v Mall 1945 AD 733).