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Article 15/2024

LabourEdge

Motion proceedings (including applications in terms of rule 31 of the CCMA rules) are not designed to resolve disputes of fact, but indeed disputes of law.  What is the content of the test formulated in Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) and so applied subsequently in Thebe Ya Bophelo Healthcare Administrators v National Bargaining Council for the Road Freight Industry 2009 (3) SA 187 (W) in determining how such disputes are resolved when considering whether the applicant is entitled to the relief claimed in such motion proceedings?

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  • The facts averred in the applicant’s affidavit, admitted by the respondent, with the facts alleged by the respondent, must justify the order, unless:
    • the dispute is not real or genuine (on the basis of a bare denial), or
    • the denials in the respondent’s version are bald and uncreditworthy. or
    • the respondent’s version raises obvious fictitious disputes of fact, or
    • the respondent’s version is palpably implausible or farfetched, or so clearly untenable that the court is justified in rejecting that version

See, further, National Scrap Metal (Cape Town) v Murray and Roberts 2012 (5) SA 300 (SCA); Ndudane v Premier of Eastern Cape (2022) 33 SALLR 6 (ECB); National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 (2) SA 279 (SCA).

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?