Skip to main content

Article 12/2024

LabourEdge

What is the viewpoint of the labour appeal court, as expressed in SA Municipal Workers’ Union obo Morwe v Tswaing Local Municipality and Another [2023] 2 BLLR 131 (LAC); (2022) 33 SALLR 60 (LAC) as to the question as to whether or not the labour court only has jurisdiction during the existence of a contract of employment and not once it has been terminated?

_____________________________________

The labour appeal court, in the aforesaid judgment, adopted the following approach:

  • s77(3) of the BCEA confers on the labour court concurrent jurisdiction with civil courts
  • the limitation exists in respect of matters concerning a contract of employment
  • whatever a civil court can hear ‘concerning a contract of employment’ is what the labour court can hear, and this is not limited to contracts which are in existence and have not been terminated
  • thus, a dispute concerning a contract of employment covers disputes whether the contract has been validly cancelled or has been breached

The previous article dealt with the distinction between misconduct constituting desertion and misconduct constituting abscondment – see, further, in this regard, Okhahlamba Local Municipality v Mabuya (2021) 32 SALLR 12 (LC).

In this article, what we attempt to do is provide some clarity as to a very different misconduct, namely, the misconduct of deeming desertion.

What is the difference between desertion and abscondment?

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?