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Article 12/2021

Labour Edge

The labour appeal court recently confirmed that so-called flexibility provisions entitle an employer to change the retirement age of employees.  How did the labour appeal court deal with such provisions contained in an employment manual and an employee’s individual letter of employment?


  1. The labour appeal court, in Legal Aid South Africa v Theunissen (2019) 30 SALLR 34 (LAC), found that the following flexibility provisions were contained in both the employer’s employment manual and the employee’s individual letter of appointment: ‘In order to achieve the professional service excellence to which the Legal Aid Board is committed it is consequently necessary that employees undertake to accept and adapt to changes in working conditions with the appropriate degree of flexibility indicated by an acknowledgment that the needs of the Legal Aid Board’s clients are paramount. By accepting this offer of employment you agree that you will be flexible in adapting to change in your working conditions.’
  2. On the basis of the above, it was found that the employer was contractually entitled to change the terms and conditions of employment (i.e. retirement age) and the employee was obliged to accept these changes.
  3. In conclusion, it was held that the process to change the retirement age was not unilateral but multilateral and consultative, with the employee having been afforded numerous opportunities to participate in the process and to safeguard his/her interests.

 

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?