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Article 3/2024

LabourEdge

What are the requirements to be met to obtain an interdict against unlawful conduct during a protected strike where the employees against whom the employer wants to obtain this interdict did not personally commit the unlawful conduct – i e did not personally throw the stone, burn the tyre, interfere with scab labour, prevent trucks from offloading, etc?

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The requirements for a final interdict are well settled, namely:

  • a clear right
  • injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended
  • the absence of an alternative remedy (Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221)

Taking the above into account, it is quite clear why an employer can obtain a final interdict against an employee who actually committed the unlawful conduct – however, the problems occur when the employee did not personally commit the unlawful conduct but was present at the scene of the unlawful conduct or, alternatively, was part of the union that went out on strike.

The constitutional court, in Commercial Stevedoring Agricultural and Allied Workers’ Union v Oak Valley Estates (2022) 33 SALLR 49 (CC), formulated the following two different approaches to be applied in such environment:

 

  • Scenario 1

 

This scenario covers the factual circumstance where the unlawful conduct is ongoing, widespread and manifest – an employer will be able to obtain a final interdict against those employees who, in such circumstance, do not disassociate themselves from the unlawful conduct (this entails that, in such scenario, there is a duty on such bystanders to disassociate themselves from the unlawful conduct)

 

  • Scenario 2

 

This scenario entails the factual scene where the unlawful conduct is isolated and sporadic and the industrial action is substantially peaceful – if an employer wishes to obtain a final interdict, it has to prove (by providing direct evidence or circumstantial evidence) that the bystander wished to associate himself/herself with the unlawful conduct

From the above, it is apparent that the mere participation in a strike is not sufficient to establish the required link between an employee and the actual or threatened injury and, furthermore, that innocent bystanders are not legally caught up in the web of unlawful conduct unless they fall within the aforesaid two scenarios.  Likewise, mere membership of the union that called for the strike is not sufficient to establish the required link between the employee and the actual or threatened injury.

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?