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Article 09/2021

Labour Edge

An employee is not obliged to challenge the procedural unfairness of his or her dismissal in the CCMA.  The employee may also challenge the non-compliance of such procedure with the contractual obligations of an employer.  Such challenge will occur in the labour court and will be for specific performance or the cancellation of the agreement and a claim for damages.  On what basis did the labour court recently, in Wereley v Productivity South Africa and Naidoo NO (2020) 31 SALLR 103 (LC), hold that it is a conceptual mistake to collapse these two causes of action simply because they both concern procedural non-compliance?


  1. It is trite that noncompliance with disciplinary procedures might lead to a finding that a dismissal was procedurally unfair, but the power of an arbitrator is limited to awarding compensation. The CCMA is not empowered to determine the contractual lawfulness of a decision to dismiss an employee, in the absence of complying with a contractually binding pre-dismissal procedure. The contractual remedies for noncompliance with an obligatory procedure remedies are not equivalent to the remedy for procedurally unfair dismissal in the LRA.
  2. In this regard, in Ngubeni v National Youth Development Agency and Another (2014) 35 ILJ 1356 (LC), at paragraph [21], the court held, that; ‘Insofar as the remaining requirements relevant to the relief sought are concerned, there is no alternative remedy that is adequate in the circumstances. Ngubeni has no right to pursue a contractual claim in the CCMA, and the law does not oblige him to have recourse only to any remedies that he might have under the LRA. Equally, he is fully entitled to seek specific performance of his contract, and is not obliged to cancel the agreement and claim damages.’
  3. On the basis of the above differences, Legrange J, in Wereley, held that It is a conceptual mistake to collapse the two causes of action simply because both concern issues of procedural noncompliance.

 

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?