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Article 07/2021

Labour Edge

If an employer deems it fit to include elaborate procedures in a contract of employment, which go beyond what is required in terms of the LRA, is the employer entitled to simply revert to the default position of the LRA?


The labour court, in Wereley v Productivity South Africa and Naidoo NO (2020) 31 SALLR 103 (LC), dealt with this issue as follows: the express incorporation of the code in the employee’s conditions of employment, both in the contract of employment and the code itself, suggested that it had been intended to create enforceable obligations, and not obligations which could simply be jettisoned at the whim of one party. If the content of the procedures was far less detailed and simply provided an opportunity to exercise the right to audi alteram partem within a rudimentary hearing framework, it might be more plausibly argued that the employer enjoyed greater freedom in determining the conduct of an inquiry. That was not the kind of procedure under consideration here. The fact that the employer had seen fit to include such an elaborate procedure in the contract of employment, which went beyond what is required of it in terms of the LRA, did not mean that it could simply revert to the default provisions of the LRA, when its own procedure did not suit it.

 

 

We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?