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Article 03/2021

Labour Edge

What are the consequences of the fact that, in the LRA, there is no reference to a right not to be unlawfully dismissed nor are there processes or procedures for the enforcement of such a right?

  1. As the majority of the constitutional court said in Steenkamp and Others v Edcon Ltd (National Union of Metalworkers of SA intervening) (2016) 37 ILJ 564 (CC), at paragraph [132], there is no reference in the LRA to a right not to be unlawfully dismissed, nor are there processes or procedures for the enforcement of such a
  2. Edcon concerned a claim that the dismissals concerned had been unlawful and invalid because the employer had acted in breach of s189A(8). The employer conceded that it had breached the provision concerned, but contended that, although this may have rendered the resultant dismissals unfair, the LRA did not contemplate invalid dismissals, nor did it empower the labour court to grant orders declaring a dismissal invalid and of no force and The constitutional court upheld this position, noting that s191 of the LRA sets out the dispute procedure to be followed to resolve unfair dismissal disputes, but nowhere is there a procedure to be used for the validity or lawfulness or otherwise of a dismissal (see paragraph [131]).
  3. Edcon further concerned a conceded breach of the LRA. In essence, the constitutional court held that the LRA establishes its own remedies for breaches of its provisions, confined as they
  4. For example, s77(3) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997, as amended (‘BCEA’), provides that the labour court has concurrent jurisdiction with the civil courts to determine disputes that concern contracts of employment. Such disputes may well contemplate declarations of invalidity sought consequent on a breach of contract. are to fairness. But the labour court is accorded jurisdiction in respect of other statutes, where the lawfulness, legality or validity of employer or employee action may well be placed in issue.
  5. On the other hand, in Malinga and Others v KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Department of Education and Others (2020) 31 SALLR 101 (LC), the applicants’ pleadings disclosed no more than an averment that the department had acted in breach of its own circulars and that, in consequence, the termination of the applicants’ employment was The applicants’ claim was not one in contract, nor was it a claim of a breach of a fundamental right and nor was it a review. In short, there was no cause of action anchored in the LRA or any statute that, for the purposes of s157(1) of the LRA, conferred exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction on the labour court. In these circumstances, the labour court had no jurisdiction to entertain the present application.

November 9, 2026

Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA reads as follows: ‘A dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to religion, conscience and belief”.

In terms of s187(2)(a) of the LRA, despite the aforesaid s187(1)(f), a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent requirements of a particular job.

What approach is to be followed to determine, firstly, whether the reason for the dismissal on the basis of religion, conscience or belief is based upon an inherent requirement of a particular job?

And, secondly, what approach is to be followed to determine whether or not an employer complied with its duty to reasonably accommodate the aforesaid category of employees?

November 2, 2026

In the previous article, we set out the traditional approach to s187(2)(b) of the LRA, covering the scenario where an employee reached the normal or agreed-upon retirement age, but continued to work beyond such age. The constitutional court, in Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Great South Auto Body CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters (Landman); Solidarity obo Strydom and Others v State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd (Solidarity) – combinedly referred to as Landman; Solidarity – had the opportunity to scrutinise such traditional approach and delivered three conflicting judgments. So, what approach should role players now employ, seeing that consensus was not reached in the constitutional court?

October 26, 2026

In terms of s187(1)(f) of the LRA, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, age.

In terms of s187(2)(b) of the LRA, despite s187(1)(f), dismissal, based on age, is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.

What is the approach traditionally adopted where an employer permits an employee to work beyond the normal or agreed-upon retirement age and subsequently wishes to terminate the services of the employee, based on age, and wishes to rely on the defence as set out in s187(2)(b)?