Article 02/2021

Labour Edge

Under which circumstances is conciliation by the CCMA or the relevant bargaining council an indispensable precondition to the labour court’s jurisdiction over unfair dismissal disputes?


  1. In National Union of Metalworkers of SA v lntervalve (Pty) Ltd and Others (2015) 36 ILJ 363 (CC); [2015] 2 BCLR 182 (CC), the constitutional court recently said the following:

‘[34]   Where no certificate has been issued because there was, for example, no conciliation meeting, but a period of 30 days from the date when the council received the referral has elapsed, the statute conspicuously does not provide that the expiry of the 30-day period is sufficient proof that an attempt was made to conciliate the dispute. It is, in my view, in that situation that the Labour Court may, in terms of section 157(4)(a), refuse to determine the dispute. This provision cannot assist in a case where the dispute was not even referred to conciliation. Section 157(4)(a) underlines the importance the LRA places upon the need for attempts to be made to try and resolve the dispute through conciliation before resorting to other methods of resolution.

[40]    Referral for conciliation is indispensable.  It is a precondition to the Labour Court’s jurisdiction over unfair dismissal disputes.’

  1. The above viewpoint was recently applied by Van Niekerk J in Malinga and Others v KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Department of Education and Others (2020) 31 SALLR 101 (LC).

In terms of s34(1) of the BCEA, an employer may not make deductions from an employee’s remuneration unless, subject to s34(2), the employee agrees, in writing, or the deduction is made in terms of a law, collective agreement, court order or arbitration award.

A case is moot and therefore not justiciable if it no longer presents an existing or live controversy. With reference to National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [1999] ZACC 17; 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC), how did the supreme court of appeal, in Mhlontlo Local Municipality and Others v Ngcangula and Another (2024) 35 SALLR 132 (SCA) recently deal with this issue?

The principle underlying the doctrine of peremption is that no person can be allowed to take up two positions inconsistent with one another, or, as is commonly expressed, to blow hot and cold, to approbate and reprobate when considering pursuing litigation. With reference to Qoboshiyane NO v Avusa Publishing Eastern Cape [2012] ZASCA 166; 2013 (3) SA 315 (SCA), what is the test to be applied to determine whether or not a party has perempted its right to institute legal proceedings?