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Article 02/2021

Labour Edge

Under which circumstances is conciliation by the CCMA or the relevant bargaining council an indispensable precondition to the labour court’s jurisdiction over unfair dismissal disputes?

  1. In National Union of Metalworkers of SA v lntervalve (Pty) Ltd and Others (2015) 36 ILJ 363 (CC); [2015] 2 BCLR 182 (CC), the constitutional court recently said the following:

‘[34]   Where no certificate has been issued because there was, for example, no conciliation meeting, but a period of 30 days from the date when the council received the referral has elapsed, the statute conspicuously does not provide that the expiry of the 30-day period is sufficient proof that an attempt was made to conciliate the dispute. It is, in my view, in that situation that the Labour Court may, in terms of section 157(4)(a), refuse to determine the dispute. This provision cannot assist in a case where the dispute was not even referred to conciliation. Section 157(4)(a) underlines the importance the LRA places upon the need for attempts to be made to try and resolve the dispute through conciliation before resorting to other methods of resolution.

…

[40]    Referral for conciliation is indispensable.  It is a precondition to the Labour Court’s jurisdiction over unfair dismissal disputes.’

  1. The above viewpoint was recently applied by Van Niekerk J in Malinga and Others v KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Department of Education and Others (2020) 31 SALLR 101 (LC).

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We think that everyone understands that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrong committed (an act or omission) by its employee during the course/scope/sphere of employment/engagement in any activity reasonably incidental to it.

But, what is the extent of an employer’s vicarious liability where the employee commits a wrong on his or her own volition?

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What is the content of traditional consensus to indicate that an agreement exists between an employer and an employee?

If, on the traditional theory of consensus, a party fails to prove an agreement upon which it relies, with reference to Sonap Petroleum SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), on what basis can a finding be made that quasi-mutual assent exists, founded on the approach that a party is precluded from denying the existence of an agreement based on their own conduct and the circumstances?

What does the three-fold enquiry entail to determine the presence of quasi-mutual assent?

In determining whether an agreement has been reached in the absence of traditional consensus, but on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, what is the extent of the duty on the party wishing to rely on such an agreement to, on the basis of reasonableness, enquire as to the contradictions that exist in the position of the other party so contained in correspondence?

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Where do delictual claims fit into dispute resolution options applicable to employment disputes?